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Abstract 
In this paper we suggest a typed compositional seman-
tics for nominal compounds of the form [Adj Noun] 
that models adjectives as higher-order polymorphic 
functions, and where types are assumed to represent 
concepts in an ontology that reflects our commonsense 
view of the world and the way we talk about it in or-
dinary language. In addition to [Adj Noun] compounds 
our proposal seems also to suggest a plausible explana-
tion for well known adjective ordering restrictions. 
Introduction & Overview
 
  
The sentence in (1) could be uttered by someone who 
believes that: (i) Olga is a dancer and a beautiful per-
son; or (ii) Olga is beautiful as a dancer (i.e., Olga is 
a dancer and she dances beautifully). 
 
Olga is a beautiful dancer (1) 
 
As suggested by Larson (1998), there are two possible 
routes to explain this ambiguity: one could assume 
that a noun such as ‘dancer’ is a simple one place 
predicate of type e t,〈 〉  and ‘blame’ this ambiguity on 
the adjective; alternatively, one could assume that the 
adjective is a simple one place predicate and blame 
the ambiguity on some sort of complexity in the 
structure of the head noun (Larson calls these alter-
natives A-analysis and N-analysis, respectively).   
 In an A-analysis, an approach predominantly advo-
cated by Siegel (1976), adjectives are assumed to be-
long to two classes, termed predicative and attribu-
tive, where predicative adjectives (e.g. red, small, 
etc.) are taken to be simple functions from entities to 
truth-values, and are extensional, and thus intersec-
tive: Adj Noun Adj Noun=     ∩ . Attributive ad-
jectives (e.g., former, previous, rightful, etc.), on the 
other hand, are functions from common noun denota-
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tions to common noun denotations – i.e., they are 
predicate modifiers of type e t e t, , ,〈〈 〉 〈 〉〉 , and are thus 
intensional and non-intersective (but are subsective: 
Adj Noun Noun   ⊆ ). On this view, the ambiguity 
in (1) is explained by posting two distinct lexemes 
(beautiful
1
 and beautiful
2
) for the adjective beautiful, 
one of which is an attributive while the other is a 
predicative adjective. In keeping with Montague’s 
(1970) edict that similar syntactic categories must 
have the same semantic type, for this proposal to 
work, all adjectives are initially assigned the type 
e t e t, , ,〈〈 〉 〈 〉〉  where intersective adjectives are consid-
ered to be subtypes obtained by triggering an appro-
priate meaning postulate. For example, assuming the 
lexeme beautiful
1
 is marked (e.g. by a lexical feature 
such as +intersective), the meaning postulate 
P Q x Q x P x Q x∃ ∀ ∀ [ ( )( ) ( ) ( )]↔beautiful ∧  would then 
yield an intersective meaning when P is beautiful
1
; 
and where a phrase such as ‘a beautiful dancer’ is 
interpreted as follows
1
:  
 
a beautiful  dancer
1
   
P x x x P x∃[( )( ( ) ( ) ( ))]⇒ λ dancer beautiful∧ ∧  
a beautiful  dancer
2
   
P x x P x∃[( )( (ˆ ( )) ( ))]⇒ λ beautiful dancer ∧  
 
While it does explain the ambiguity in (1), several 
reservations have been raised regarding this proposal. 
As Larson (1995; 1998) notes, this approach entails 
considerable duplication in the lexicon as this means 
that there are ‘doublets’ for all adjectives that can be 
ambiguous between an intersective and a non-
intersective meaning. Another objection, raised by 
McNally and Boleda (2004), is that in an A-analysis 
there are no obvious ways of determining the context 
in which a certain adjective can be considered inter-
sective. For example, they suggest that the most 
natural reading of (2) is the one where beautiful is 
                                               
1
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describing Olga’s dancing, although it does not mod-
ify any noun and is thus wrongly considered intersec-
tive by modifying Olga.  
 
Look at Olga dance. She is beautiful. (2) 
 
While valid in other contexts, in our opinion this ob-
servation does not necessarily hold in this specific 
example since the resolution of ‘she’ must ultimately 
consider all entities in the discourse, including, pre-
sumably, the dancing activity that would be intro-
duced by a Davidsonian representation of ‘Look at 
Olga dance’ (this issue is discussed further below).  
 A more promising alternative to the A-analysis of 
the ambiguity in (1) has been proposed by Larson 
(1995, 1998), who suggests that ‘beautiful’ in (1) is a 
simple intersective adjective of type e t,〈 〉  and that 
the source of the ambiguity is due to a complexity in 
the structure of the head noun. More specifically, Lar-
son suggests that a deverbal noun such as dancer 
should have a Davidsonian representation such as 
df
x x e e e x( )( ( ) ( )( ( ) ( , )))∀ = ∃dancer dancing agent∧ ;   
that is, any x is a dancer iff x is the agent of some 
dancing activity (Larson’s notation is slightly differ-
ent). In this analysis, the ambiguity in (1) is attrib-
uted to an ambiguity in what ‘beautiful’ is modifying, 
in that it could be said of Olga or her dancing activ-
ity. That is, (1) is to be interpreted as follows: 
 
Olga is a beautiful  dancer   
e e e olga∃⇒ ( )( ( ) ( , )∧dancing agent  
         e olga( ( ) ( )))beautiful beautiful∧ ∨  
 
In our opinion, Larson’s proposal is plausible on sev-
eral grounds. First, in Larson’s N-analysis there is no 
need for impromptu introduction of a considerable 
amount of lexical ambiguity. Second, and for reasons 
that are beyond the ambiguity of beautiful in (1), 
there is ample evidence that the structure of a dever-
bal noun such as ‘dancer’ must admit a reference to 
an abstract object, namely a dancing activity; as, for 
example, in the resolution of ‘that’ in (3). 
 
Olga is an old dancer. 
She has been doing that for 30 years. 
(3) 
 
Furthermore, and in addition to a plausible explana-
tion of the ambiguity in (1), Larson’s proposal seems 
to provide a plausible explanation for why ‘old’ in 
(4a) seems to be ambiguous while the same is not 
true of ‘elderly’ in (4b): ‘old’ could be said of Olga or 
her teaching; while ‘elderly’ is not an adjective that is 
ordinarily said of objects that are of type activity: 
 
a.  Olga is an old teacher 
b.  Olga is an elderly teacher 
(4) 
 
With all its apparent appeal, however, Larson’s pro-
posal is still lacking. For one thing, and while it pre-
supposes that some sort of type matching is what 
ultimately results in rejecting the subsective meaning 
of ‘elderly’ in (4b), the details of such processes are 
more involved than Larson’s proposal seems to imply. 
For example, while it explains the ambiguity of 
‘beautiful’ in (1), it is not quite clear how an N-
Analysis can explain why ‘beautiful’ does not seem to 
admit a subsective meaning in (5). 
 
Olga is a beautiful young street dancer  (5) 
 
In fact, ‘beautiful’ in (5) seems to be modifying Olga 
for the same reason the sentence in (6a) seems to be 
more natural than that in (6b).  
 
a. Maria is a clever young girl 
b. Maria is a young clever girl  
(6) 
 
The sentences in (6) exemplify what is known in the 
literature as adjective ordering restrictions (AORs). 
However, despite numerous studies of AORs (e.g., see 
Wulff, 2003; Teodorescu, 2006), the slightly differing 
AORs that have been suggested in the literature have 
never been formally justified. What we hope to dem-
onstrate below however is that the apparent ambigu-
ity of some adjectives and adjective-ordering restric-
tions are both related to the nature of the ontological 
categories that these adjectives apply to in ordinary 
spoken language. 
 Thus, and while the general assumptions in Lar-
son’s (1995; 1998) N-Analysis seem to be valid, it will 
be demonstrated here that nominal modification seem 
to be more involved than has been suggested thus far. 
In particular, it seems that attaining a proper seman-
tics for nominal modification requires a much richer 
type system than currently employed in formal se-
mantics. Before we proceed to nominal modification, 
therefore, in the next section we will briefly introduce 
a type system that is akin to that suggested several 
years ago by Sommers (1963); a system that forms 
the foundation of a compositional semantics that is 
grounded in an ontology that in turn reflects our 
commonsense view of the world and the way we talk 
about it in ordinary language. 
Ontological Concepts as Types 
We assume a Platonic universe that includes every-
thing that can be spoken about in ordinary language, 
in a manner akin to that suggested by Hobbs (1985). 
However, in our formalism concepts belong to two 
quite distinct categories: (i) ontological concepts, such 
as animal, substance, entity, artifact, event, 
state, etc., which are assumed to exist in a subsump-
tion hierarchy, and where the fact that an object of 
type human is ultimately an object of type entity is 
expressed as ⊑human entity ; and (ii) logical con-
cepts, which are the properties (that can be said) of 
and the relations (that can hold) between ontological 
concepts. Since adjectives are our immediate concern, 
consider the following illustrating the difference be-
tween ontological and logical concepts: 
 
a. x( :: )dedicated human             (7) 
b. x( :: )clever animal  
c. x( :: )imminent event  
d. x( :: )old entity  
f. x( :: )beautiful entity  
 
These predicates are supposed to reflect the fact that, 
in ordinary spoken language, dedicated is a prop-
erty that is ordinarily said of objects that must be of 
type human (7a); that clever could be said of objects 
of type animal (7b); imminent is a property that is 
said of objects that must be of type event (7c); etc.  
In addition to logical and ontological concepts, 
there are also proper nouns, which are the names of 
objects; objects that could be of any type. A proper 
noun, such as sheba, is interpreted as 
 
1
sheba P x x sheba P x∃  [( )( ( :: , ‘ ’) ( :: ))]⇒ ∧λ noo thing t
 
where x s( :: , )thingnoo  is true of some unique object 
x (which could be any thing), and s if (the label) s is 
the name of x, and t is presumably the type of ob-
jects that P applies to (to simplify notation we often 
write 
1
sheba P sheba P sheba∃  [( :: )( ( :: ))]⇒ thing tλ ). 
Consider now the following, where we have assumed 
that x( :: )humanthief , i.e., that thief is a property 
that is ordinarily said of objects that must be of type 
human, and where x y( , )BE  is true when x and y are 
the same objects
2
: 
 
(8) sheba is a thief   
 sheba x
1
( :: )( )∃ ∃⇒ thing  
             x sheba x( ( :: ) ( , ))BEhumanthief ∧  
 
That is, there is a unique object named sheba (which 
could be any thing) and some x such that x (which 
must be of type human) is a thief and such that she-
ba is that x. Note now that sheba is associated with 
more than one type in a single scope, and this 
necessitates a type unification, where a type unifica-
tion ( )•s t  between two types s and t, and where 
Q , ,∃ ∀∈ { }  is defined (for now) as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
( :: )( ( )), ( )
( :: ( ))( ( )) ( :: )( ( )), ( )
( :: )( ( )),
andwhere
( :: )
( ) ( )


• ≡

 ⊥

⊥ =
• ⊥ = ⊥ • =
s s t
s t t t s
t t
Qx P x if 
Qx P x Qx P x if 
Qx P x otherwise
P x
  
⊥
⊥
⊑
⊑
   (9) 
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 We are using the fact that, when a is a constant and P is a pre-
dicate, Pa x Px x a[ ( )]≡ ∃ =∧  (see Gaskin, 1995). 
Since ( )⊑human thing , the type unification required 
in (8) now proceeds as follows: 
 
sheba is a thief   
sheba
1
( :: ( ))∃ •⇒ human thing  
 x x sheba x( )( ( ) ( , ))∃ BEthief ∧  
sheba x x sheba x
1
( :: )( )( ( ) ( , ))∃ ∃ BE⇒ thiefhuman ∧  
 
Finally, and since sheba x( , )BE , we could replace x 
by the constant sheba obtaining the following: 
 
sheba is a thief   
sheba sheba
1
( :: )( )∃ ∃⇒ human  
 sheba sheba sheba( ( ) ( , ))BEthief ∧  
sheba sheba sheba True
1
( :: )( )( ( ) )∃ ∃⇒ thiefhuman ∧  
sheba sheba
1
( :: )( ( ))∃⇒ thiefhuman  
 
In the final analysis, therefore, ‘Sheba is a thief’ is 
interpreted as follows: there is a unique object named 
sheba, an object that must be of type human, and such 
that sheba is a thief
3
. 
 Finally, note the clear distinction between onto-
logical concepts (such as human), which Cocchiarella 
(2001) calls first-intension concepts, and logical (or 
second-intension) concepts, such as thief(x). That is, 
what ontologically exist are objects of type human, not 
thieves, and thief is a mere property that we have 
come to use to talk of objects of type human. More-
over, logical concepts such as thief are assumed to 
be defined by virtue of some logical expression, such 
as 
df
x x( :: )( ( ) ),ϕ∀ ≡human thief where the exact na-
ture of ϕ  might very well be susceptible to temporal, 
cultural, and other contextual factors, depending on 
what, at a certain point in time, a certain community 
considers an thief to be. What is of particular inter-
est to us here is that logical concepts such as thief 
(or dancer, writer, etc.), are defined by logical 
expressions that admit abstract objects such as activi-
ties, processes, states, etc., each of which could be the 
object of modification.  
Types and Nominal Modification  
First we will use the type system described above and 
the notion of type unification to properly formalize 
the intuitions behind Larson’s proposal for nominal 
modification. Subsequently we show that our formal-
ism explains the relationship between the notion of 
                                               
3
 The observant reader might have noticed that the removal of 
sheba x( , )BE  essentially means that the copular ‘is’ was in this 
case interpreted as the ‘is’ of identity. This was due to the fact 
that in this case a subsumption relation exists between the 
types of the relevant objects. In other contexts, such as ‘Liz is 
aging’, ‘Sheba is angry’, etc., where it seems that we are deal-
ing with the ‘is’ of predication, removing x y( , )BE involves in-
troducing some implicit relation between the different types 
that do not unify (human/process, human/state), essentially 
resulting in interpretations such as ‘Liz is-going-through-
the-process-of aging’, ‘Sheba is-in-a-state-of anger’, etc. 
Such details however are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
intersective vs. non-intersective adjectives and that of 
adjective-ordering restrictions.  
 
Formalizing Larson’s Proposal. First let us begin 
by showing that the apparent ambiguity of an adjec-
tive such as ‘beautiful’ is essentially due to the fact 
that beautiful applies to a very generic type that sub-
sumes many others. Consider the following, where we 
assume x( :: )beautiful entity ; that is that beau-
tiful can be said of any entity: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful  dancer  
e olga e∃ ∃ dancingactivity human⇒ ( :: )( :: )( ( )∧  
    e olga eagent beautifulhuman entity( , :: ) ( ( :: )∧  
      olga( :: )))beautiful entity∨  
 
Note now that, in a single scope, e is considered to be 
an object of type activity as well as an object of 
type entity, while Olga is considered to be a human 
and an entity. This, as discussed above, requires a 
pair of type unifications: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful  dancer  
e olga e∃ ∃ dancingactivity human⇒ ( :: )( :: )( ( )∧  
    e olgaagent human( , :: )∧  
     e( ( :: ( ))•beautiful activity entity                    
       • olga( :: ( ))))∨ beautiful human entity  
 
Note that both types unifications will all succeed in 
this case since • =( )activity entity activity  and 
• =( )human entity human . The final interpretation is 
thus the following: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful  dancer  
e olga∃ ∃activity human⇒ ( :: )( :: )  
     e e olgadancing agent( ( ) ( , )∧ ∧  
           e olga( ( ) ( )))beautiful beautiful∨                    
 
In the final analysis ‘Olga is a beautiful dancer’ is 
interpreted as: Olga is the agent of some dancing ac-
tivity, and either Olga is beautiful or her dancing. 
However, consider now the following: 
 
Olga is an elderly teacher   
∃ ∃ teachingactivity humane olga e⇒ ( :: )( :: )( ( )  
   agent human e olga∧ ( , :: )  
   •elderly activity human e∧ ( ( :: ( ))  
  •elderly human human olga∨ ( :: ( ))))  
 
While the type unification involving Olga is straight-
forward, e is considered here to be an object of type 
activity as well as an object of type human. Since 
( )• =activity human ⊥  this particular type unifica-
tion fails, resulting in the following:  
 
Olga is an elderly teacher   
∃ ∃ teachingactivity humane olga e⇒ ( :: )( :: )( ( )  
     agent elderly e olga  olga∧ ∧ ⊥ ∨( , ) ( ( )))  
e e e olga olga( )( ( ) ( , ) ( )))∃⇒ teaching agent elderly∧ ∧
 
Adjective-Ordering Restrictions. Consider again 
the logical concepts given in (7). Note that beauti-
ful can be said of objects of type entity, and thus it 
can be said of a cat, a person, a city, a movie, a 
dance, an island, etc. Therefore, beautiful can be 
thought of as a polymorphic function that applies to 
objects at several levels and where the semantics of 
this function depend on the type of the object, as il-
lustrated in figure 1 below
4
. Thus, and although 
beautiful applies to objects of type entity, in say-
ing ‘a beautiful car’, for example, the meaning of 
beautiful that is accessed is that defined in the type 
physical (which could in principal be inherited from 
a supertype). Moreover, and as is well known in the 
theory of programming languages, one can always 
perform type casting upwards, but not downwards 
(e.g., one can always view a car as just an entity, 
but the converse is not true)
5
.  
 For example, assuming x( :: )red physical  and 
x( :: )beautiful entity ; that is, assuming that red 
can be said of physical objects and beautiful can 
be said of any entity, then the type casting required 
in (11a) is valid, while that in (11b) is not.  
 
a. x( ( :: ) :: )beautiful red physical entity    (11) 
b. x( ( :: ) :: )red beautiful entity physical  
 
This, in fact, is precisely why ‘Jon owns a beautiful 
red car’ is more natural than ‘Jon owns a red beauti-
ful car’. In general, a sequence x( ( :: ) :: )
1 2
a a s t  is a 
valid sequence iff ( )s t⊑ . Note that this is different 
from type unification, in that the unification does 
succeed in both cases in (11). However, before we per-
form type unification the direction of the type casting 
must be valid. The importance of this interaction will 
become apparent below. 
 
How an Ambiguous Adjective Gets One Mean-
ing. Let us explain the example in (5), where we ar-
gued that Larson’s proposal cannot explain why 
‘beautiful’, which is considered to be ambiguous in 
(1), does not admit a subsective meaning in (5).  
 
 Olga is a beautiful  young dancer  
∃ ∃e olga( :: )( :: )⇒ activity human  
    e( ( )dancing  
          e olga( , :: )humanagent∧  
        e( ( ( :: ) :: )physical entitybeautiful young∧                   
             olga( ( :: )physicalbeautiful young∨  
                 :: )))entity  
 
Note now that the casting required is valid in both 
cases. In other words, the order of adjectives is valid.  
                                               
4
 It is perhaps worth investigating the relationship between the 
number of meanings of a certain adjective (say in a resource 
such as WordNet), and the number of different functions that 
one would expect to define in the subsumption hierarchy.  
5
 Technically, the reason we can always cast up is that we can 
always ignore additional information. Casting down, which 
entails adding information, is however undecidable. 
This means that we can now perform the required 
type unifications, which would proceed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Adjectives as polymorphic functions 
 
 
 Olga is a beautiful  young dancer  
e olga e∃ ∃ dancingactivity human⇒ ( :: )( :: )( ( )∧  
       e olgaagent human( , :: )∧  
      e( ( ( :: ( ))•beautiful young activity physical                    
        olga( (beautiful young∨  
•:: ( )))))human physical  
 
By (9), and since ( )• =⊥activity physical , the 
term •e( :: ( ))young activity physical  is reduced 
to ⊥e( :: )young  and subsequently to ⊥ . Finally, 
and taking β β⊥ = ( )∨  we eventually get the follow-
ing: 
 
 Olga is a beautiful  young dancer  
∃ ∃e olga( :: )( :: )⇒ activity human  
       e( ( )dancing  
         e olga( , )agent∧  
        olga( ( )))beautiful young∧  
 
Note here that since beautiful was preceded by 
young, it could have not been applicable to an ab-
stract object of type activity, but was instead re-
duced to that defined at the level of physical, and 
subsequently to that defined at the type human. A 
valid question that comes to mind here is how then 
do we express the thought ‘Olga is a young dancer 
and she dances beautifully’. The answer is that we 
usually make a statement such as this: 
 
Olga is a young and beautiful dancer       (12) 
 
Note that in this case we are essentially overriding 
the sequential processing of the adjectives, and thus 
the adjective-ordering restrictions (or, equivalently, 
the type-casting rules!) are no more applicable. That 
is, (12) is essentially equivalent to two sentences that 
are processed in parallel: 
 
 Olga is a young and beautiful dancer  
Olga is a young dancer≡     
       Olga is a beautiful dancer ∧  
 
Note now that ‘beautiful’ would again have an inter-
sective and a subsective meaning, although ‘young’ 
will only apply to Olga due to type constraints: 
 
 Olga is a young and beautiful  dancer  
∃ ∃e olga( :: )( :: )⇒ activity human  
       e( ( )dancing  
         e olga( , :: )humanagent∧  
         e olga( ( ) ( ))beautiful beautiful∧ ∨  
         olga( ))young∧  
The Rich Type Structure of Nominals 
That an adjective such as beautiful can potentially 
modify Olga’s dancing in a sentence such as ‘Olga is a 
beautiful dancer’ is clearly due to the fact that the 
deverbal noun ‘dancer’ a complex structure that con-
tains, at a minimum, references to a dancing activ-
ity, as well as the agent of the activity. A noun such 
as ‘dancer’ can however be potentially modified by 
other nouns, in which case the target of these modifi-
cations are some attributes of the dancing activity. 
For example, in  
 
a. Olga is a street dancer             (13) 
b.  Olga is a night dancer 
c.  Olga is a flamenco dancer 
 
we are clearly describing Olga’s dancing activity by 
stating where she (usually) dances (13a); when she 
dances (13b); and what she dances (13c). It would 
seem therefore that a deverbal noun such as ‘dancer’ 
must have a structure such as the following: 
 
df
x x( )( ( )∀ =dancer  
     e x y( :: )( :: )( :: )∃ ∃ ∃activity human time  
         z u( :: )( :: )∃ ∃location content  
             e( ( )dancing  
            e x( , )agent∧  
            e y( , )time∧  
            e z( , )location∧  
            e u( , )theme∧  
     ))  
 
Now assuming that street :: location , night :: time , 
and flamenco :: content then type unification, along 
the lines described above, would ensure that each 
noun modifies the correct slot. Furthermore, there 
seems to be the equivalence of adjective-ordering re-
strictions, in that sequences of nouns usually obey 
some strict rules. For example, (14a) is clearly more 
natural than (14b), although the type casting rules 
seem to be more complex than in the case of adjec-
tives. 
 
a. Olga is a flamenco street dancer         (14) 
b.  #Olga is a street flamenco dancer 
 
Furthermore, it seems that these rules are also a 
function of the general category of the deverbal noun. 
For example, while ‘dancer’ is a noun that is derived 
from an activity verb, there are various subclasses 
within this general category that have a slightly dif-
ferent structure, not to mention deverbal nouns that 
are derived from other verb classes (e.g., process, 
state, etc). For example, the deverbal noun ‘offer’, is 
considerably different from the deverbal noun ‘dancer’ 
in this important respect: 
 
≡x x is the  of a dancing activity( ) agentdancer  
x x is the  of an offering activity( ) ≡ objectoffer  
 
Thus, and while both ‘generous’ and ‘attractive’ are 
adjectives that can be said of an object of type human, 
it seems that only ‘generous’ but not ‘attractive’ can 
be predicated of Jon in (15). 
  
a. Jon made a generous offer               (15) 
b.  Jon made an attractive offer 
 
Formulating these processes in a strongly typed com-
positional semantics would have to however wait for 
another place and another time.  
Concluding Remarks  
In this paper we have shown that nominal modifica-
tion can be adequately treated in a semantics embed-
ded in a strongly-typed ontology; an ontology that 
reflects our commonsense view of the world and the 
way we talk about it in ordinary language. While our 
concern in this paper was the semantics of [Adj Noun] 
nominals, our proposal seems to also provide an ex-
planation for some well-known adjective-ordering re-
strictions and might also provide a plausible frame-
work for the semantics of [Noun Noun] compounds. 
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